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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The following is a complete list of all named parties to the action below (some of 
which were never properly joined and/or served): 
1. PacifiCorp d/b/a Utah Power, an Oregon corporation; 
2. Fox Ridge Planned Communities, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
3. Tractus, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; and 
4. The Redevelopment Agency of Lehi City, a governmental entity. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), by order dated December 10, 2002. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the district court correctly enter summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp, 
granting PacifiCorp's motion for summary judgment and denying Fox Ridge's 
cross-motion? 
A district court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness. See Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). "Because entitlement 
to summary judgment is a question of law, [an appellate court is to] accord no deference to 
the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented." Id. In conducting this de novo 
review, the appellate court should "apply the same standard as that applied by the trial court." 
Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). The standard applied by the trial 
court is set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
These issues were preserved in the trial court by motion. See R. at 26 (PacifiCorp's 
motion); R. at 144 (Fox Ridge's cross-motion); R. at 988 (trial court's Ruling); R. at 992 
(trial court's Order). 
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2. Did the district court correctly exclude certain items of evidence, including the 
Carlson Easement, the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement, certain paragraphs of the 
Christensen and Tolbert Affidavits, and the entire Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark? 
These issues are reviewed only for abuse of discretion: "the trial court has a great deal 
of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its ruling will not be 
overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion." See Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 
1J14, 17 P.3d 1110; Meyers v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 747 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (stating that "the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion"). 
These issues were preserved in the trial court by motion. See R. at 757 (PacifiCorp's 
Motion to Strike); R. at 948 (PacifiCorp's Motion to Strike Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark); R. 
at 988 (trial court's Ruling); R. at 992 (trial court's Order). 
3. Did the district court correctly deny Fox Ridge's conditional Rule 56(f) motion 
for continuance? 
These issues are also reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See Crossland Savings 
v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (stating that "we review a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion under the abuse of discretion standard" and that "we will 
not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonabilitv"); see also Price Dev. Co. 
v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, f30, 995 P.2d 1237 (stating that "[w]e will review a trial court's 
grant or denial of a rule 56(f) motion under an abuse of discretion standard"). 
These issues were preserved in the trial court by motion. See R. at 152 (Fox Ridge's 
Motion); 988 (trial court's Ruling); R. at 992 (trial court's Order). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of (or even relevant to) this appeal. Several Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Evidence are relevant to this appeal, and those are set forth in Fox Ridge's 
Brief, at 2, but PacifiCorp does not believe that an interpretation of those Rules is 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PacifiCorp initiated this lawsuit on January 16, 2001 by filing a Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment. R. at 19. PacifiCorp sought a declaratory judgment from the district 
court declaring that PacifiCorp had the right, pursuant to certain easements, to enter Fox 
Ridge's property for the purpose of replacing and altering a power line and accompanying 
support structures. Id. at 13. PacifiCorp wished to replace the existing wooden H-frame 
support structures, built in the 1950s using 1950s technology, with more modern single-pole 
steel structures. Id. at 13-19. 
Soon thereafter, PacifiCorp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking 
declaratory relief under the plain terms of the easements. Id. at 24. Fox Ridge contested the 
motion, and filed various memoranda and exhibits of its own. E.g., id. at 183-95, 592-661, 
847-912. PacifiCorp protested that certain of Fox Ridge's exhibits were improper on several 
grounds, including relevancy, lack of foundation, and hearsay. Id. at 757 (PacifiCorp's 
Motion to Strike); id. at 948 (PacifiCorp's Motion to Strike Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark). 
These matters all came before the trial court for oral argument on March 8,2001, and the trial 
court heard oral argument from both sides on the various motions. Id. at 977. 
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On March 12,2001, the trial court issued its Ruling, ruling that PacifiCorp's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and PacifiCorp's motions to strike should be granted, and ruling that 
Fox Ridge's cross-motion for summary judgment should be denied. Id. at 988. On April 11, 
2001, the trial court signed a written order memorializing its March 12 Ruling. Id. at 992. 
Although the trial court's April 11 Order disposed of many of the issues in the case, 
it was not a final order, because Fox Ridge had stated counterclaims, some of which were 
pled against other parties, that had not been decided by the trial court's April 11 Order. Id. 
at 112 (Fox Ridge's counterclaim, stating claims against The Redevelopment Agency of Lehi 
City, among others). The record reflects that Fox Ridge did not ever serve its counterclaim 
on The Redevelopment Agency of Lehi, and that Fox Ridge did not make any effort 
whatsoever to prosecute its remaining claims. Id. at 993-1000 (entire post-Order record 
consists of seven (7) pages, including the trial court's Order of Dismissal). Because Fox 
Ridge made no effort to prosecute its remaining claims, the trial court entered an Order of 
Dismissal, for failure to prosecute, on September 24, 2002. Id- at 1000. 
On October 23,2002, Fox Ridge filed its Notice of Appeal, appealing from, inter alia, 
the issues decided in the trial court's Order of April 11, 2001. Id. at 1001-02. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1956, Utah Power & Light Company (UP&L), PacifiCorp's predecessor-in-interest, 
acquired certain perpetual easements that would enable it to construct and maintain a power 
line between its substation at 90th South in Salt Lake County and the Hale substation at the 
mouth of Provo Canyon in Utah County. In 1956, most of the property now owned by Fox 
Ridge was owned by Sylvan W. Clark and Zella R. Clark ("the Clarks"). See R. at 6. On 
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December 21, 1956, the Clarks—for good and valuable consideration—granted UP&L a 
perpetual easement over portions of their property ("the Clark Easement"), which provides 
as follows: 
Sylvan W. Clark and Zella R. Clark, his wife, Grantors, of Utah County, Utah, 
do hereby convey and warrant to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, Grantee, for the sum of 
One ($ 1.00) Dollar and other valuable consideration, a perpetual easement and 
right of way for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
inspection, relocation and replacement of the electric transmission, 
distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of the Grantee, and one three pole 
and nine two pole towers structures and 4 guy anchors with the necessary 
guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other attachments affixed thereto, for the 
support of said circuits, on, under, over, through, and across a tract of land 
fifty (50) feet in width, located in Utah County, Utah, and being twenty-five 
(25) feet on each side of the following described center line: 
[legal description follows]. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the 
full and complete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby 
granted, and all rights and privileges incident thereto, including the right to cut 
and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches and other obstructions 
which may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoyment 
of this easement. 
See R. at 6 (bold and strikeout in original). A smaller portion of the property now owned by 
Fox Ridge was then owned by the Hansen Lime & Stucco Company.1 On December 10, 
1956, the Hansen Lime & Stucco Company granted UP&L a perpetual easement over 
1
 Fox Ridge contests the fact that some of its property was, in 1956, owned by the Hansen 
Lime & Stucco Company, and therefore asserts that the Hansen Lime Easement is irrelevant 
to this lawsuit. R. at 660 (stating that "[t]he only relevant easement is the Clark Easement"). 
For the purposes of this appeal (and for the purposes of the summary judgment motions 
below), the dispute on this point is immaterial, because the language of the two Easements 
is substantively identical. 
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portions of their property (the "Hansen Lime Easement"). R. at 8. With the exception of the 
name of the Grantor, the number of support structures, and the date, the Hansen Lime 
Easement is identical in all substantive respects to the Clark Easement. Compare R. at 6 with 
R. at 8. Herein, the Hansen Lime Easement and the Clark Easement are collectively referred 
to as "the Easements." 
UP&L also obtained easements from other landowners along the route of the proposed 
power line. All of the easements, including the Clark and Hansen Lime Easements, were 
form documents, each containing essentially the same language, with blanks to be filled in 
for the names of the Grantor(s) and the number of support structures that UP&L then 
intended to place on the servient estate. Some servient estates were small, and required an 
easement solely for the power lines themselves to cross over the air space of the surface 
property. See, e.g., R. at 611, 619. Other servient parcels were larger, and required an 
easement not only for the airspace for the lines themselves, but also required the erection of 
a number of support structures. In these cases, the parties to the various easements filled in 
the number of support structures then intended to be installed. See, e.g., R. at 617. The 
Clark Easement and the Hansen Lime Easement were no exception. R. at 6, 622 (Clark 
Easement); R. at 8 (Hansen Lime Easement). 
In 1957, pursuant to the various easements, UP&L constructed a 138 kV transmission 
line (the "Power Line") between the 90th South substation and the Hale substation. Portions 
of the Power Line crossed the Clarks' property. R. at 52. From 1957 to the present time, the 
Power Line has been continuously used to supply electrical power and energy to PacifiCorp's 
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(and UP&L's) customers in Utah and Salt Lake counties, and the Power Line is an integral 
segment of PacifiCorp's transmission grid system. Id. 
When the Power Line was constructed in 1957, UP&L used wooden H-frame support 
structures to support the electrical transmission lines. Specifically, UP&L erected structures 
consisting of two (and sometimes three) wooden poles with a horizontal brace attached near 
the top tying them together. R. at 51. These wooden poles supported a total of five 
lines—three conductors that transmit electrical power, and two cables that serve as lightning 
arrestors. Id. Across the Clarks' property, UP&L erected one three-pole structure and nine 
two-pole structures. R. at 6, 622. From 1957 to 2001, the Power Line had the two- and 
three-pole wooden support structures, and PacifiCorp, from time to time, entered the servient 
estates to repair and maintain the Power Line. 
In recent years, it came to PacifiCorp's attention that the configuration of the Power 
Line—built in the 1950s with 1950s technology and standards—was no longer adequate to 
serve all of the users of electricity served by the Power Line. R. at 52. PacifiCorp 
determined that, in order to properly re-configure the Power Line, it would be necessary to 
replace the existing transmission lines (or "conductors") with conductors that are slightly 
larger in diameter and by installing three additional conductors. The voltage of the Power 
Line would remain the same—138 kV. See R. at 51-52. As part of the re-configuration, it 
would also be necessary to replace the old wooden power pole support structures with taller, 
single-pole metal structures that are stronger, have a longer useful life, and are more efficient. 
R. at 51. The single-pole structures, because they have only one pole instead of two or three, 
are easily contained within the 50-foot corridor of land already dedicated to the Easements. 
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Id. PacifiCorp also determined that it would install each replacement structure in 
approximately the same centerline and in approximately the same lateral location as the H-
frame wooden structure it will replace. Id. The new single-pole structures average 89 feet 
in height, as compared to an average height of 52 feet for the H-frame wooden structures. 
R. at 703. 
In the summer of 2000, PacifiCorp notified Fox Ridge of its intent to replace the old 
wooden pole support structures with the taller single-pole steel structures. Fox Ridge was 
not immediately receptive to the idea, and, in an effort to resolve the situation short of 
litigation or condemnation proceedings, PacifiCorp asked Fox Ridge if it would be willing 
to negotiate a new easement, making plain PacifiCorp's right to enter Fox Ridge's property 
and replace the old poles. See R. at 789. To this end, PacifiCorp presented Fox Ridge and 
its counsel with a draft of a proposed new easement, intended to resolve and settle the 
situation. R. at 594. Ultimately, Fox Ridge refused to negotiate a new easement. 
Still, throughout the fall of 2000, the parties attempted to resolve the situation without 
resort to the courts. Time soon became an issue, however, because PacifiCorp needed to 
have the new single-pole configuration up and running by June 1, 2001. R. at 50. On 
January 16, 2001, when it became clear that it could wait no longer, PacifiCorp filed this 
action in the district court, asking for a declaratory judgment that the plain terms of the 
Easements allow PacifiCorp to remove the old wooden pole structures and replace them with 
single-pole steel structures. PacifiCorp also moved for summary judgment—solely on the 
issues surrounding interpretation of the Easements—and for a speedy hearing. R. at 44, 59. 
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On or about February 5, 2001, Fox Ridge responded by answering PacifiCorp's 
complaint, filing a counterclaim against PacifiCorp, and (although incorrectly styled as a 
counterclaim) a third-party complaint against The Redevelopment Agency of Lehi City 
("Lehi RDA"). R. at 112. Among Fox Ridge's causes of action were claims for declaratory 
judgment; claims against PacifiCorp and the Lehi RDA for denial of due process; claims 
against PacifiCorp and the Lehi RDA for violations of the Utah Constitution; and other 
claims. R. at 65-112. On all claims other than its claims for declaratory relief, PacifiCorp 
and the Lehi RDA were joint defendants. Id. Curiously, however, Fox Ridge did not ever 
serve its "counterclaim" on the Lehi RDA, and the Lehi RDA accordingly did not ever 
appear in the action before the trial court. 
Soon thereafter, on or about February 16, 2001, Fox Ridge filed two separate 
summary judgment motions. First, Fox Ridge filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Re: 
Redevelopment, Due Process, and Adequate Consideration Claims. R. at 136. However, 
Fox Ridge did not serve a copy of the motion on the Lehi RDA, and did not take adequate 
steps to make the Lehi RDA a party to the motion. 
Second, Fox Ridge filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Scope of 
Easement, asking for summary judgment of its own on the easement interpretation issues that 
were the subject of PacifiCorp's original motion. R. at 144. This motion did not concern the 
Lehi RDA. This motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of Fox 
Ridge's cross-motion and in opposition to PacifiCorp's original motion. R. at 661. 
Along with the two summary judgment motions, Fox Ridge also filed a Conditional 
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance, arguing that "in the event the Court is not prepared to 
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rule as a matter of law that Fox Ridge is entitled to summary judgment, Fox Ridge requests 
that the Court delay ruling on PacifiCorp's motion for Summary Judgment until such time 
as Fox Ridge is able to obtain appropriate affidavits, depositions, and other discovery." R. 
at 151. 
On or about February 21, 2001, after receiving the two summary judgment motions, 
PacifiCorp moved the trial court to bifurcate the proceedings below by proceeding to hear 
the cross-motions regarding the Easements on an expedited basis, but postponing the motion 
concerning the claims related to the Lehi RDA until after Fox Ridge had served the Lehi 
RDA and given the Lehi RDA notice and an opportunity to be heard on the motion. R. at 
664. The trial court eventually agreed with the arguments in PacifiCorp's motion to bifurcate 
and refused to entertain Fox Ridge's first motion, stating that Fox Ridge's first motion uis 
not properly before the Court as it contains claims that may only be brought against entities 
not joined to this action." R. at 987. 
PacifiCorp also took issue with some of the evidence Fox Ridge submitted in support 
of its position on the cross-motions regarding the Easements, arguing that Fox Ridge relied 
upon evidence that is irrelevant, without foundation, speculative, contains hearsay, and in 
violation of Rule 408. Accordingly, on or about February 27, 2001, PacifiCorp filed a 
Motion to Strike, asking the trial court to exclude certain items of evidence relied upon by 
Fox Ridge. R. at 757. Specifically, PacifiCorp asked the trial court to exclude: 
easements entered into by UP&L and/or PacifiCorp in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
beyond, on the ground that such easements, entered into twenty or thirty years 
after the Easements, were irrelevant to the interpretation of the Easements, 
especially in light of the fact that both parties claimed that the Easements were 
unambiguous; 
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• portions of affidavits related to the alleged amount of damages purportedly 
suffered by Fox Ridge and its related entity, Tractus, LLC, on the ground that 
these affidavits are irrelevant, concern an entity (Tractus) not properly a party 
to the litigation, are based on speculation, and are not based upon personal 
knowledge; and 
• the proposed new easement that was discussed between Fox Ridge and 
PacifiCorp in 2000 as part of settlement negotiations, on the ground that the 
proposed new easement was a settlement proposal inadmissible under Utah R. 
Evid. 408. 
R. at 775-86. 
At the same time, PacifiCorp also filed a reply memorandum in support of its original 
motion regarding the Easements; the memorandum also served as a memorandum in 
opposition to Fox Ridge's cross-motion regarding the same issues. R. at 734. 
On or about March 2, 2001, Fox Ridge filed its reply memorandum in support of its 
cross-motion. R. at 912. Along with its reply memorandum, Fox Ridge submitted an 
affidavit of one S. Kenly Clark, an individual purporting to be the son of Sylvan and Zella 
Clark, the original Grantors of the Clark Easement. See R. at 891. The affidavit contains 
rank hearsay, including S. Kenly Clark's averment that his parents "did not want tall steel 
towers running across the property" and that they, rather than UP&L, had been the ones who 
had "crossed out the word 'towers' because they did not want anything larger than the 
original wooden poles put on the property." R. at 890. 
On March 7, 2001, only five days after the affidavit was filed, PacifiCorp filed a 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark, on the ground that the affidavit contained 
inadmissible hearsay statements. R. at 948. 
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On March 8,2001, the matter came before the district court for oral argument. R. at 
977. The Court stated that, due to the fact that Fox Ridge had not ever served the Lehi RDA, 
the only motions that it would entertain on March 8 were the cross-motions regarding the 
scope of the Easements, the Rule 56(f) motions, and the various motions to strike. Id. 
Counsel for both Fox Ridge and PacifiCorp presented argument to the court. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement. Id. 
Four days later, on March 12,2001, the district court issued a Ruling. R. at 988. The 
district court ruled that the Easements were unambiguous, and could be construed as a matter 
of law. R. at 987. The district court ruled that PacifiCorp's interpretation of the Easements 
was the correct one, and that the proposed alteration and replacement of the poles was 
allowed under the plain terms of the Easements. R. at 982-87. Finally, the district court 
ruled that PacifiCorp's motions to strike were well-taken, and granted them to the extent that 
they were not rendered moot by the court's ruling on the scope of the Easements. R. at 981. 
The trial court also denied Fox Ridge's motion for Rule 56(f) continuance. Id. 
On April 11,2001, the trial court signed an order memorializing its Ruling. R. at 992. 
This order disposed of the relevant portions of the case as far as PacifiCorp was concerned, 
but it was not a final order because Fox Ridge had pled other claims (e.g., the RDA claims) 
against PacifiCorp and the Lehi RDA. These other claims had not been resolved by the trial 
court's March 12 Ruling or April 11 Order. 
After the entry of the Order, PacifiCorp entered onto Fox Ridge's property, and began 
the work of replacing the wooden-pole structures with the single-pole steel structures. The 
work is now complete, and the single-pole structures are in place and operational. 
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Also, after the entry of the Order, Fox Ridge did nothing to prosecute or develop any 
of its remaining claims. Fox Ridge did not ever serve the Lehi RDA, and did not ever renew 
its first summary judgment motion regarding the RDA claims. Furthermore, Fox Ridge did 
not seek any form of interlocutory or injunctive relief to stop PacifiCorp from replacing the 
H-frame structures with the single-pole structures. Finally, on April 15, 2002—more than 
a year after entry of the Order—the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause commanding 
the parties to appear and explain why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. R. at 997. After continuing the matter until August 2002 at the request of Fox 
Ridge, R. at 998, the trial court dismissed the action on September 24, 2002, after no party 
(including Fox Ridge) appeared at the show cause hearing, thereby making the April 11, 
2001 order final and appealable. R. at 999, 1000. 
Fox Ridge filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. at 1003. In the Notice of Appeal, Fox 
Ridge proclaimed that it was appealing "all issues decided in the Final Order" and on "all 
issues decided" by the April 11 Order. R. at 1002. However, in its brief, Fox Ridge has 
chosen to appeal only the issues surrounding (1) the cross-motions for summary judgment 
regarding the scope of the Easements; (2) PacifiCorp's motions to strike evidence; and (3) 
the denial of Fox Ridge's conditional Rule 56(f) motion. See Aplt. Br. at 1-2. All other 
issues decided by the district court's final order (dated September 24, 2002) or the April 11 
Order (including all issues related to the dismissal of the RDA claims) are deemed waived 
because they are not briefed in Fox Ridge's opening brief. See Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. 
of Utah. 2001 UT 75, f 10 n.l, 31 P.3d 543. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp and 
against Fox Ridge. As a threshold matter, the district court correctly determined that the 
Easements are unambiguous, and that the intent of the parties can therefore be determined 
from an examination of the plain terms of the Easements. The district court then correctly 
interpreted the unambiguous Easements, finding that the Easements' plain terms, which state 
that PacifiCorp may "alter[]" and "replace[]" the circuits and support structures, allow 
PacifiCorp to remove the two- and three-pole wooden support structures and replace them 
with somewhat taller single-pole steel structures. Because the unambiguous terms of the 
Easements support this conclusion, the district court correctly entered summary judgment as 
a matter of law in favor of PacifiCorp and against Fox Ridge. 
In addition, the district court correctly excluded certain items of extrinsic evidence 
proffered by Fox Ridge in support of its arguments. Unambiguous instruments must be 
interpreted without resort to extrinsic evidence, and therefore extrinsic evidence is irrelevant 
here. Moreover, some of the evidence Fox Ridge attempted to submit contained inadmissible 
hearsay, speculative statements made without foundation, or evidence of settlement 
discussions and was therefore inadmissible for additional reasons. In any event, the district 
court's decision to exclude the evidence was not an abuse of its discretion. 
Finally, the district court correctly denied Fox Ridge's conditional motion for a Rule 
56(f) continuance, ruling that additional discovery aimed at finding extrinsic evidence was 
irrelevant to an interpretation of an unambiguous document. 
The district court's determinations were entirely correct, and should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF PACIFICORP REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE 
EASEMENTS 
The first issue before this Court is whether the trial court correctly entered summary 
judgment in favor of PacifiCorp (and against Fox Ridge) regarding the scope of the 
Easements. As more fully discussed below, the district court's decision to enter summary 
judgment in PacifiCorp's favor on these issues was entirely correct. 
A. Legal Framework: General Principles of Contract and Easement 
Interpretation 
1. The interpretation of unambiguous contracts is a question of law. 
In all cases of contractual or easement interpretation, "the intentions of the parties are 
controlling." See Dixon v. Pro Image. Inc.. 1999 UT 89, ^[13, 987 P.2d 48. Where the 
document is unambiguous, the intent of the parties should be determined solely "from the 
plain meaning of the language." Id.; see also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands 
and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (stating that "[t]he basic rule of contract 
interpretation" requires "that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the content of 
the instrument itself (citation omitted)). 
"Whether contract language is ambiguous is [itself] a question of law." Dixon, 1999 
UT 89, [^14. In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider "any 
relevant evidence." See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
1995). However, if the court considers such evidence and determines that the language of 
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the contract is unambiguous, "then the parties' intentions must be determined solely from the 
language of the contract." Id. 
In examining the language of an unambiguous document, this Court must "attempt to 
construe the [document] so as to harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions." Id. 
(citations omitted); see also Plateau, 802 P.2d at 725 (stating that "[e]ach contract provision 
is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none" (citation omitted)). And interpretation of unambiguous documents is a 
question of law for the Court. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, ^ [6,983 
P.2d 575 (stating that "[interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law"); Terry 
v. Price Mun. Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (stating that "construction of a deed is 
a question of law"). 
Only if the Easements are ambiguous may a court consider extrinsic evidence as to 
the parties' intentions. Plateau, 802 P.2d at 725. In this case, both parties assert that the 
Easements are clear and unambiguous on their face, even though the parties espouse differing 
interpretations of the Easements. See R. at 644-45 (Fox Ridge's argument that the 
Easements are "clear and unambiguous"). However, it is well-settled that "a contract 
provision is not necessarily ambiguous just because one party gives that provision a different 
meaning than another party does." Plateau, 802 P.2d at 725. Indeed, "[t]o demonstrate 
ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable." Id. Where one party's 
interpretation or construction of the contract is unreasonable, the contract will be held to be 
unambiguous and may be interpreted on summary judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., R 
& R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074-77 (Utah 1997); see also 
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Taylor v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923, 928-29 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Cade v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
2. The extent of an easement is determined by the grant, not by the 
use to which either the easement or the servient estate has been put. 
Under Utah law, "[t]he accepted rule is that the language of the grant [of an easement] 
is the measure and the extent of the right created; and that the easement conveyed should be 
so construed as to burden the servient estate only to the degree necessary to satisfy the 
purpose described in the grant." Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963). In 
cases involving an express (as opposed to a prescriptive) easement, "ftjhe extent of [the] 
easement is determined by the grant." Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Movie, 159P.2d 
596, 597 (Utah 1945) (emphasis added), modified on other grounds. 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 
1946). Once the character of the easement has been fixed by the terms of the grant, any 
changes or alterations in the use of the easement must be measured against the scope of the 
uses allowed by the terms of the grant itself, rather than measured against the uses that have 
occurred on the property since the grant was created. Cf ]d- Thus, under Utah law, if a 
change in the use of the easement corridor fits within the uses authorized by the terms of the 
Easements, the proposed change does not, by definition, expand the scope of the Easements 
and does not effect a burden on the servient estate greater than the burden envisioned in, and 
assented to, in the Easements themselves. 
Accordingly, any argument Fox Ridge might make regarding the changed use of its 
own property—e.g., effects resulting from the planned development of the Traverse 
Mountain project—is completely irrelevant. Similarly, any argument Fox Ridge might make 
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regarding the historical use to which UP&L/PacifiCorp have put the Easements—e.g., 
whether they have used wooden poles—is likewise irrelevant. The narrow question is 
whether the Easements, as drafted and agreed upon in 1956, allow PacifiCorp to replace the 
wooden pole structures with single-pole steel structures. 
B. Under the Unambiguous Terms of the Easements, PacifiCorp Has the 
Right to Replace the Wooden Structures with Single-Pole Steel Structures 
The question that this Court must decide, against this legal framework, is whether the 
district court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the replacement of wooden pole 
structures with single-pole steel structures is within the scope of the original grant. The 
district court's decision was correct. 
The unambiguous terms of the Easements allow PacifiCorp to enter the subject 
property now owned by Fox Ridge, and "erect[j," "maintain]," "repair," alter[]," "inspect[]," 
"relocat[e]," and "replace[]," the electric transmission circuits and their support structures. 
See R. at 6, 8 (language of Easements). It is plain that the parties to the Easements 
contemplated alterations to and replacement of the circuits, lines, and support structures from 
time to time. What PacifiCorp has done to the Power Line amounts to nothing more than 
alteration and replacement of the circuits and support structures, activities clearly authorized 
by the original grant contained in the Easements. It is undisputed that the alterations 
PacifiCorp has made have not increased the amount of land actually used by PacifiCorp, and 
it is also undisputed that the voltage of the Power Line has remained unchanged at 138 kV. 
The trial court's determination that the unambiguous terms of the Easements allow 
PacifiCorp's alterations was correct. 
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Indeed, the trial court's decision in this case is supported by reported decisions from 
courts across the country that have been faced with nearly identical issues. One case with 
striking factual similarities to this one is Florida Power Corp. v. Silver Lake Homeowners 
Ass'n, 727 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). In that case, Florida Power had acquired an 
express power line easement in 1948 across Silver Lake's property that gave the company 
the right, privilege and easement forever to construct, operate and maintain an 
H-frame line for the transmission and distribution of electricity, including 
necessary communication and other wires, poles, guy and brace poles, [etc.] 
. . . , [t]ogether with the right to patrol, inspect, alter and improve, repair and 
rebuild the same. 
Id. at 1149-50. In 1995, Florida Power "reconstructed the power line by removing the 
wooden H-frame structures and installing more modem steel monopole structures as 
replacements." Id. at 1150. The court noted that the steel monopole structures were "taller 
than the wooden H-frame structure" and that "the voltage carried by the power line has been 
increased [from 115 kV] to 230 kilovolts," but that "[t]he steel monopole occupies the exact 
path of the prior wooden H-frame poles, and is completely contained within the same 
easement." Id. Silver Lake filed suit against Florida Power, alleging that the reconstruction 
had "exceeded the scope of the 1948 easement which only authorized the construction of an 
H-frame line." Id. The trial court found for Silver Lake, but the appellate court reversed, 
stating that 
[notwithstanding the steel monopole's taller height, it occupies the exact path 
of the prior wooden H-frame poles and is completely contained within the 
same prescribed easement area. We find the reconstruction by FPC to be 
within the scope of its 1948 easement. Accordingly, the summary judgment 
is reversed. 
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Id. at 1151 (emphasis added).2 
In reaching its decision, the court in Florida Power noted that "the holder of an electric 
transmission line easement may avail itself of modern inventions and improvements so long 
as such action is within the scope of the easement." Id. at 1150. Although the scope of an 
easement may not be changed, many courts have liberally expanded the permitted use as a 
result of technological innovations. See Powell on Real Property § 34.12[2], at 34-187 
(emphasizing that power companies have been allowed to incorporate new technologies into 
structures under easements); Hash v. Sofinowski. 487 A.2d 32, 34 (Pa. 1985) (stating that 
"our courts have consistently permitted express easements to accommodate modern 
developments, so long as the use remains consistent with the purpose for which the right was 
originally granted"). Such expanded use is based upon the presumption that advances in 
technology are contemplated in the grant of the easement. See id. at 34. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion as Florida Power. For instance, in 
West Penn Power Co. v. Bruni. 387 A.2d 1316, 1318 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), an appellate 
court also reversed a contrary finding by the trial court, and held that a power company had 
the right, under the express terms of its easement, to undertake the type of work that 
2
 Fox Ridge has assailed the Florida Power decision, arguing that "the easement involved 
in Florida Power is . . . much broader" than the Easements at issue in this case. See R. at 
632; see also Aplt. Br., at 30-31 (stating that "the language of grant at issue in those cases 
[including Florida Power] is broader than that of the Clark Easement"). This argument is 
simply wrong. The easement at issue in Florida Power is, if anything, narrower than the 
Easements at issue here, because the easement in Florida Power specifically referred to "an 
H-frame line," whereas the Easements at issue here contain no such specification. 
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PacifiCorp has undertaken in this case. In West Penn Power, the power company obtained 
an easement allowing it to 
construct up to 14 poles and two (2) towers on appellees' property, as well as 
"such anchors, guys, wires, cables, and fixtures as the [power company] may 
deem necessary, including the right from time to time to install additional 
wires, cables, and fixtures, upon, over, under, along, across, and through land 
o f appellees. 
Id. at 1317. Several years after obtaining the easement, the power company entered the 
servient estate, and upgraded its power lines from a wooden-pole system to a steel-pole 
system. The court noted that the steel poles were approximately 30 feet taller than the 
wooden poles. Id. The trial court found for the landowner, but, on review, the appellate 
court reversed the judgment of the trial court, and found for the power company, stating that 
"appellees have not produced any evidence in this record to support a conclusion that 
appellant, in erecting these two steel poles and installing the new wire within the right of way 
previously granted by appellees, has exceeded the rights granted to it in the right of way 
agreement." Id. at 1318. Accordingly, the appellate court entered an order reversing the 
judgment of the trial court. Id. 
Furthermore, in Haves v. City of Loveland, 651 P.2d 466 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), a 
municipal power company owned a prescriptive easement3 across the plaintiffs' property for 
3
 Fox Ridge has argued that Hayes is inapposite because that case involved a prescriptive 
easement rather than a written easement. R. at 631. If anything, however, that fact makes 
the Hayes case more (not less) compelling. In prescriptive easement cases, the scope of the 
easement is determined by and limited to the use, see Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, 159 
P.2d at 597, and the use in Hayes was exclusively H-frame wooden pole structures, see 
Hayes, 651 P.2d at 468. Thus, in Hayes, there was no helpful easement language (such as, 
for instance, the "alter and replace" language which should be determinative in this case); 
(continued...) 
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the purposes of constructing and maintaining a power line. At the time the power line was 
constructed, the city used the same configuration used by UP&L in 1957: wooden-pole H-
frame structures. In 1980, the city "reconstructed the power line, removing the wood H-
frame structure and installing a replacement steel pole." Id. at 468. The court noted that 
"[t]he steel structure is taller than the wood H-frame structure, and, although the voltage 
carried by the power line was not changed, three additional conductors were affixed to the 
steel pole," and that "[t]he steel pole occupies less physical space on the ground than the pole 
it replaced, and requires no additional land for its safe operation and maintenance." Id. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the city had effected a taking, and filed an inverse condemnation suit 
against the city. The trial court held that no taking had been effected, and the appellate court 
affirmed, on the ground that the city's easement allowed the city to enter the property and 
upgrade the power lines to the single-pole system. The appellate court noted that easements 
should be construed to encompass technological innovations in the industry, and stated that 
it is uncontro verted that the reconstruction of the . . . power line was a normal 
and usual evolution and development for this type of power line. The 
reconstruction of the power line by the City is, therefore, a change in the 
degree of use, not the kind of use, and is within the scope of the easement 
which burdened the property at the time of the petitioners' acquisition. 
Id- (emphasis added). Moreover, the court added that "there is no evidence in the record to 
support [plaintiffs'] contention that the burden on their servient tenement has increased." Id. 
Other courts across the country have reached the same decision as the appellate courts 
in Hayes, Florida Power, and West Penn Power. See, e.g., Minnkota Power Coop, v. Lake 
3
 (...continued) 
there was only a long history of wooden pole usage. 
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Shure Properties, 295 N.W.2d 122, 128 (N.D. 1980) (stating that "the extent of an express 
easement must be determined by the terms of the grant," and that "we believe the uprating 
of the [power] line is consistent with the purpose . . . for which the easements were granted 
and it is reasonably necessary for Minnkota to uprate existing transmission lines rather than 
be forced to construct a new line to transmit additional energy"); Lower Colorado River 
Auth. v. Ashbv. 530 S.W.2d 628,632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that "the appellant's right 
to 'maintain' [the power line] would include the right to completely remove and rebuild the 
transmission line in whatever manner and form authorized by the easement"); Talty v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 347 N.E.2d 74,75-76 (111. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a power 
company could, under the terms of the easement, upgrade its power line from 220kV to 
345kV and could install new steel support structures, stating that "a right of way is one 
including the right of improving, from time to time, according to the improvements of the 
age"). 
This well-settled judicial authority involving similar factual circumstances is 
compelling, and points persuasively toward the conclusion that PacifiCorp's alterations and 
replacements are expressly permitted by the unambiguous terms of the Easements. 
C. Fox Ridge's Interpretation of the Easements is Unreasonable and 
Strained 
Fox Ridge, both before the trial court and on appeal, maintains a differing 
interpretation of the Easements. However, as discussed below, that interpretation is strained 
and unreasonable, in that it ignores and essentially reads out of the instruments critical 
language, and in that it in essence adds other terms to the Easements that simply are not 
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there. Because Fox Ridge's interpretation is untenable, the district court correctly construed 
the Easements as a matter of law on summary judgment. 
Fox Ridge interprets the Easements as follows: "the parties intended that UP&L 
would have the right to erect two and three pole structures of the type it actually built." See 
Aplt. Br., at 20. Fox Ridge also complains that the single-pole steel structures violate the 
Easements because they are taller and have a wider base diameter than the H-frame 
structures, and because they will allegedly require "setbacks" from the Power Line for future 
development. Id. at 13. Fox Ridge's interpretation is simply unsupported by the plain 
language of the Easements, and must therefore be rejected. 
Contrary to Fox Ridge's assertion, there is no language in the Easements that would 
in any way require UP&L/PacifiCorp to erect only "structures of the type it actually built." 
Fox Ridge fails to recognize that the Easements do not contain any of the following features: 
• a restriction on the type of material out of which the support structures 
must be built. Nothing in the Easements requires the support structures 
to be made of wood, steel, iron, plastic, or any other particular material. 
a height restriction. Nothing in the Easements requires the support 
structures to be limited in height. Nothing in the Easements restricts 
PacifiCorp from erecting support structures that are, for instance, 89 
feet high. 
• a voltage restriction. Nothing in the Easements requires PacifiCorp to 
limit the voltage carried on the Power Line. Nothing in the Easements 
restricts PacificCorp from increasing the voltage from 138 kV to, for 
instance, 345 kV. 
a restriction on the size of the structure's base. Nothing in the 
Easements requires PacifiCorp to limit the size or diameter of the base 
of the support structures. 
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• a restriction on the number of cross-arms that can be placed on the 
support structures. Nothing in the Easements requires PacifiCorp to 
limit the number of cross-arms affixed to the support structures. 
• a restriction on the number of conductors. Nothing in the Easement 
even purports to limit PacifiCorp to a certain number of conductors for 
the Power Line. 
• any discussion of ''setbacks/' Nothing in the Easement requires 
PacifiCorp to restrict the type of structures (placed within the easement 
corridor) to structures that do not trigger setback requirements. The 
only property-based restriction in the Easements is the one requiring 
PacifiCorp to keep the Power Line and support structures within the 50-
foot easement corridor. 
Fox Ridge has invented these contractual terms out of whole cloth in an effort to support its 
position. These terms are simply not in the Easements. 
Fox Ridge attempts to make much of the language in the Easements describing the 
then-installed support structures as "two pole" and "three pole" structures. See R. at 6. 
However, as noted above, this language was reference only to the type of structures that 
UP&L then intended (in 1957) to install upon the property. It is not, by its terms, limiting 
language. It is clear that PacifiCorp would have the right to "replace" the two- and three-
pole wooden support structures with two- and three-pole steel structures that are 89 feet tall. 
PacifiCorp has chosen not to erect such structures, but it could do so by simply adding 
another pole and cross arm to the single-pole structures. Presumably, that is not the result 
Fox Ridge is seeking in this matter. If 89-foot-tall two-pole steel structures are authorized 
under the Easements, as they clearly are, the less-intrusive single-pole steel structures of that 
same height must surely also be authorized under the plain terms of the Easements. 
Fox Ridge also attempts to make much of the fact that the parties struck the word 
"towers" and inserted the word "structures" in its place. See Aplt. Br., at 23-24. At this 
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point, 47 years after the fact, it is unclear which party, if not both, requested the change. Fox 
Ridge maintains that this indicates that the Clarks intended that single-pole steel structures 
not be placed on the property.4 Id. This argument is speculative and completely unfounded. 
As the trial court found, the word "structures" is a much broader term than "towers"; indeed, 
"towers" is merely a subset of the more broader term "structures." See R. at 983. By striking 
the word "towers" and inserting the word "structures," the parties did not intend to limit the 
type of structure that could be built on the Subject Property. Indeed, the parties' use of a 
broader term can only be interpreted as expanding the permissible types of "structures" to 
be built on the Subject Property. As the trial court determined, "[i]t is a strained reading of 
the granting language to say that double steel poles would be permissible 'structures' and 
single steel poles would be impermissible 'towers.'" Id.5 
Moreover, Fox Ridge's interpretation of the Easements reads out of the instruments 
critical language. Clearly, the Easements give PacifiCorp the right to "alter[]" and 
"replace^" both the circuits/conductors as well as the supporting structures.6 See R. at 6, 8. 
4
 In support of this contention, Fox Ridge attempted to submit an affidavit containing 
rank hearsay from one S. Kenly Clark, an individual purporting to be the son of Sylvan and 
Zella Clark. The trial court correctly struck that affidavit as inadmissible hearsay. R. at 981. 
5
 As discussed below, in connection with the motion to strike the S. Kenly Clark 
Affidavit, it is unclear after all of these years what the parties intended by striking the word 
"towers" and inserting the word "structures." One plausible interpretation of the strikeout 
is that the parties agreed that the large 345kV lattice towers would not be allowed on the 
property. Obviously, the single-pole steel structures that PacifiCorp has placed on the 
property are completely different than the huge lattice towers. If the parties, by the strikeout, 
meant merely to exclude the massive lattice towers, then PacifiCorp's installation of the 
single-pole structures is clearly allowed under the Easements. 
6
 Before the trial court, Fox Ridge posited the truly incredible argument that PacifiCorp 
(continued...) 
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Fox Ridge interprets the words "alter" and "replace" extremely narrowly, effectually reading 
out of the instruments PacifiCorp's right to alter and replace the supporting structures. 
Essentially, Fox Ridge maintains that any "alteration" of the support structures may only 
result in extremely minor changes being made to the same basic support structure. See Aplt. 
Br., at 25. This is simply not what the word "alter" means. Fox Ridge provides the Court 
with a dictionary definition of "alteration," which is completely circular and utterly 
unhelpful. See Aplt. Br., at 25 (noting that "alteration" means "the state of being altered"). 
What Fox Ridge neglects to tell the Court is that the dictionary defines the root word "alter" 
as follows: "to make different in some particular, as size, style, course, or the like." See 
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, at 60 (1996) (emphasis added). Courts 
interpreting the word "alter" have agreed that the term encompasses substantial change, 
stating that "[a]n alteration when used in reference to a structure usually denotes a change 
or substitution made in a particular part of a structure of such a substantial nature as to make 
the structure itself or an important part thereof materially different from what it formerly 
was." See Boston & Albany R. Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 51 N.E.2d 445, 447 
(Mass. 1943) (emphasis added): see also Stowe v. Wood, 199 N.W.2d 323,327 (Iowa 1972) 
(stating that an "alteration" is "a variation, changing, making different; a change of thing 
from one form or state to another; a change or substitution in a substantial particular of one 
6
 (...continued) 
had the right to alter, replace, and maintain the circuits, but not the support structures. See 
R. at 641-42. The trial court soundly rejected this argument, see R. at 983 (stating that the 
argument "that the right to inspect, alter, replace, or repair refers only to circuits and not to 
poles is likewise strained"), and Fox Ridge appears to have abandoned this spurious 
argument on appeal, now admitting that PacifiCorp has the right to alter, replace, etc. the 
support structures as well as the circuits. 
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part of the building; an installation that changes its structural quality; a substantial change 
therein" (emphasis added)). 
Clearly, then, under accepted definitions of the term "alter," PacifiCorp would be able 
to change the size of the support structures, and to make the structures materially different 
from their former state. "Alter" means more than mere tailoring of a suit, despite Fox 
Ridge's creative arguments to the contrary. See Aplt. Br., at 25, 33-34. The Easements' 
language allowing PacifiCorp to "alter[]" and "replace[]" the support structures must, under 
any fair interpretation, allow PacifiCorp to remove the wooden poles and replace them with 
single-pole steel structures that are 89 feet tall. 
In short, Fox Ridge's proffered interpretation of the Easements is simply untenable, 
because Fox Ridge attempts to read into the Easements restrictive language that simply is not 
there, and because Fox Ridge fails to give effect to the language that allows PacifiCorp to 
"alter[]" and "replace[]" the circuits and support structures. As discussed above, because Fox 
Ridge's proffered interpretation of the Easements is unreasonable and untenable, the district 
court properly interpreted the Easements as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage. 
D. PacifiCorp Has Not Increased the Burden on the Servient Estate 
Finally, Fox Ridge's argument—based on inadmissible evidence regarding 
"setbacks," etc.—that PacifiCorp's installation of the single-pole structures has increased the 
burden on the servient estate is misguided. See Aplt. Br., at 13. The district court correctly 
recognized that Fox Ridge's bare factual averments—even if correct, which PacifiCorp 
disputes—do not create a dispute of material fact, because the question of whether the new 
single-pole structures pose a greater burden to the land than did the wooden structures is not 
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a relevant inquiry in this dispute. What is relevant is whether the new structures have 
increased the burden beyond that permitted by the Easements. The burden that can be 
permissibly placed on a servient estate is measured by the rights granted under the easements, 
not the extent to which an easement holder may have exercised those rights in the past. See, 
e.g.. Tally* 347 N.E.2d at 76 (taller transmission structures authorized under powerline 
easement; initial use of the easement "does not indicate any intention to limit the easement 
to lines of that size"); Ashby, 530 S.W.2d 628, 631-32 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (trial court's 
conclusion that easement holder's rights were limited to the original H-frames placed in the 
easement would result in a forfeiture of the rights granted under the easement); Central 
Power and Light Co. v. Holloway. 431 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968) (taller power 
structures allowed under terms of the easement; power company's rights not limited to the 
initial installation of shorter structures). As discussed above, the terms of the Easements 
clearly allow alteration and replacement of the circuits and the support structures. 
Accordingly, inquiry into what effect PacifiCorp's exercise of those rights may have on the 
servient estate is not relevant in the resolution of the matter before the court. 
Fox Ridge argues that the new structures would require a greater setback than is 
required by the existing structures and would therefore deprive Fox Ridge of developable 
building lots. However, Fox Ridge purchased the property with full knowledge of the terms 
of the Easements. The terms of the Easements clearly allow the proposed alterations. Fox 
Ridge cannot now argue that, due to its own lack of due diligence or erroneous assumption 
about the meaning of the terms of the Easements, a greater burden is now being added than 
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is allowed by the Easements' terms. If the terms of the Easements allow the proposed 
alterations, the burden is not, by definition, increased.7 
In essence, Fox Ridge is attempting to effect, through its own changed use of its 
property, a diminution ofPacifiCorp 's rights under the plain terms of the Easements. If Fox 
Ridge were not planning to develop the property, and, instead, were planning to leave the 
property unchanged, or to conduct agricultural operations thereon, this case would not be 
before this Court. Only because of Fox Ridge's plans to change the use of the 
property—which, for 45 years and more, has been more or less undeveloped—does Fox 
Ridge now try to keep PacifiCorp from altering the circuits and structures. Fox Ridge 
cannot, through its own changed use, diminish the scope of PacifiCorp's rights under the 
terms of the Easements. 
The district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp and 
against Fox Ridge. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED PACIFICORP'S 
MOTIONS TO STRIKE EVIDENCE 
The second issue before this Court is whether the district court correctly granted 
PacifiCorp's various motions to strike evidence submitted by Fox Ridge. As noted above, 
the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion, see supra p. 1-2, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 
admit the inadmissible hearsay and other irrelevant evidence proffered by Fox Ridge. 
7
 In fact, some landowners have actually maintained lawsuits arguing that the power 
company should be compelled to install single-pole steel structures, rather than H-frame 
wooden structures, because the steel structures impose less of a burden. See, e.g., Albin v. 
Illinois Commerce Comm'n. 408 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (111. Ct. App. 1980). 
583674vl - 3 0 -
A. The District Court Correctly Excluded the Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark 
In support of its various filings, Fox Ridge submitted an affidavit of one S. Kenly 
Clark ("the Clark Affidavit"), an individual purporting to be the son of Sylvan and Zella 
Clark, the original Grantors under the Clark Easement. See R. at 891. In the affidavit, Mr. 
Clark states that he was 21 years old in 1956, and that he "paid close attention to my parents' 
negotiations" with UP&L. R. at 890. As a result of this "close attention," Mr. Clark claims 
to remember, after 45 years, that his parents "did not want tall steel towers running across 
the property" and that "they crossed out the word 'towers' because they did not want 
anything larger than the original wooden poles put on the property." Id. 
Realizing that Mr. Clark's affidavit contained hearsay statements, counsel for Fox 
Ridge sent PacifiCorp a letter immediately before filing the Clark Affidavit giving 
PacifiCorp notice, "pursuant to Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence" 
of Fox Ridge's "intention to offer the Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark in support of its cross 
motion for summary judgment re: scope of easement." R. at 887. PacifiCorp responded 
exactly how Fox Ridge must have known it would: by filing a motion to strike the Clark 
Affidavit. R. at 948. The district court granted that motion, refusing to admit the Clark 
Affidavit under the narrow "residual exception" to the hearsay rule. That decision was 
correct. 
1. The Clark Affidavit should be stricken because it is extrinsic 
evidence, and such evidence is irrelevant to a determination of the 
scope of the unambiguous Easements. 
Irrespective of whether it contains inadmissible hearsay (and it does), the Clark 
Affidavit is inadmissible for an independent reason: it represents extrinsic evidence 
regarding an unambiguous document. If the contract (or easement) terms are clear and 
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unambiguous, they are normally interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning 
without resort to extrinsic evidence. See Plateau, 802 P.2d at 725 (stating that "[pjarol 
evidence is generally not admissible to explain the intent of a contract which is clear on its 
face"); see also Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Because the Easements are unambiguous, they are to be interpreted according to their 
plain language, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Because the Clark Affidavit is extrinsic 
to the Easements, the Clark Affidavit is irrelevant to a determination of the scope of the 
Subject Easements. 
2. The Clark Affidavit should be stricken because it is inadmissible 
hearsay. 
More substantively, however, Mr. Clark's affidavit is inadmissible hearsay. Utah R. 
Evid. 802 provides that "[hjearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these 
rules." Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, "hearsay" is defined as "a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted." See Utah R. Evid. 801(c). Fox Ridge has admitted that the 
Clark Affidavit is hearsay as that term is defined under the Rules. See R. at 887,908. Thus, 
if the Clark Affidavit does not come within one of the so-called "hearsay exceptions" set 
forth in Rules 801, 803, or 804, the Clark Affidavit is inadmissible. 
None of the numerous "hearsay exceptions" listed in the Rules applies by its terms to 
the Clark Affidavit. Fox Ridge appears to acknowledge this, but nonetheless argues that the 
Clark Affidavit "is admissible under Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)." See Aplt. Br., at 44-45. 
Those Rules are known as the "residual exceptions" to the hearsay rule, and they read as 
follows: 
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(24) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness [is admissible although it is hearsay], if the court determines 
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) 
the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement 
may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including 
the name and address of the declarant. 
Utah R. Evid. 803(24); see also Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (worded nearly identically). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]hese rules require guarantees of 
trustworthiness;' see State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432, 436 (Utah 1989), and are "intended 
for use in those rare instances where, although the out-of-court statement does not fit into a 
recognized exception, its admission is justified by the inherent reliability of the statement and 
the need for its admission," see State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989). The Utah 
Court of Appeals has emphasized that the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule are "to be 
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." See State v. Webster, 2001 UT 
App 238, ]|26, 32 P.3d 976. The most common situation in which these rules are invoked is 
in cases involving child sexual abuse, and where the prosecution attempts to admit into 
evidence videotaped statements of the young victim. See, e.g., Lenaburg, 781 P.2d at 436; 
see also Nelson, 777 P.2d at 482; State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140,1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In every reported opinion of the Utah appellate courts addressing these rules, the proffered 
evidence was found to be inadmissible—no Utah appellate court of which PacifiCorp is 
aware has ever sanctioned the admission of evidence under these rules, and, on several 
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occasions, appellate courts have reversed trial courts that have attempted to admit evidence 
under these rules. See, e,g„ Lenaburg, 781 P.2d at 436; Nelson, 777 P.2d at 482; Webster, 
2001 UT App 238, f23, 32 P.3d 976; Barela, 779 P.2d at 1142.8 
This case should not be the first case in which a Utah appellate court approves the 
admission of evidence under the residual exceptions. The Clark Affidavit is rank hearsay, 
and has neither "guarantees of trustworthiness" nor "inherent reliability" that would justify 
its admission in the face of the great weight of authority mandating exclusion of such 
evidence. 
First, the Clark Affidavit is not offered to prove a material fact. As discussed above, 
it is offered as extrinsic evidence, which is only relevant if the easements are first determined 
to be ambiguous. If the easements, on their face, are clear and unambiguous, then the Clark 
Affidavit, as well as all other forms of extrinsic evidence, is completely immaterial. See 
Utah R. Evid. 803(24)(A), 804(b)(5)(A). 
Second, the general purposes of the Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice will 
not be furthered by admission of the Clark Affidavit into evidence. The Clark Affidavit 
contains highly questionable hearsay recollections that date back to 1956, 47 years in the 
past. In 47 years, memories dim and details fade, and, as a result, the half-century-old 
hearsay statements of Mr. Clark are inherently unreliable. 
Fox Ridge has argued that courts outside of Utah have admitted evidence, on occasion, 
under these residual exceptions, where the declarant is deceased. See R. at 908 n.5 (citing 
Tartaglia v. Hodges, 10 P.3d 176 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)). However, Utah courts have not 
been so lenient, and have denied admission of similar evidence under similar circumstances. 
See State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to allow admission 
of an affidavit of a deceased declarant under the residual exceptions). 
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Moreover, Mr. Clark does not even state how he came to know the details he is now 
swearing that he can remember. He does not state that he personally participated in the 
easement negotiations; rather, he states only that he "paid close attention to [his] parents' 
negotiations," see R. at 890, and that "[his] parents wanted to revise the original easement" 
and that his father "didn't want anything larger than the original poles," id. (emphasis added). 
It is unclear what this means—whether Mr. Clark spoke with his parents about the 
negotiations, whether he overheard the negotiations themselves, whether he has simply 
speculated about what his father wanted, whether he spoke with a UP&L representative, or 
something else. He avers only that he "discussed the easement" with his parents, presumably 
after it was executed, id., but does not say that he ever discussed the negotiation with them. 
We are left to conjecture what the true basis, if any, for Mr. Clark's statements might be. 
Furthermore, the Clark Affidavit is itself ambiguous. Specifically, Clark states that 
his parents did not want "tall steel towers" running across their property, and Clark interprets 
this alleged statement by his parents as meaning that "they did not want anything larger than 
the original wooden poles." Id. The term "tall steel towers" is undefined in the Clark 
Affidavit; certainly, the larger 345 kV lattice towers are a different animal than the smaller 
single-pole structures PacifiCorp has placed on the property. The Clark Affidavit, even if 
taken at face value, does not shed any light on the question of whether Clark's parents 
intended to allow the smaller single-pole structures, because Clark's discussions with his 
father, for all we know from reading the affidavit, may have been referencing the larger 
lattice towers. Without the opportunity to cross-examine Clark's father, we will never know. 
In short, the trial court's refusal to admit the Clark Affidavit was entirely proper. 
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B. The District Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of the 2000 Settlement 
Negotiations, Including the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement 
Fox Ridge also attempted to submit, in support of its arguments, a copy of what it 
calls the "2000 Fox Ridge Easement." See R. at 594. This document is actually a settlement 
proposal that the trial court correctly ruled was inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 408. See 
R. at 982. 
1. Rule 408 bars admission of the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement. 
In June 2000, PacifiCorp was aware of a dispute (or potential dispute) with Fox Ridge 
regarding the Power Line and, in an attempt to settle the dispute short of litigation, 
PacifiCorp entered into negotiations with Fox Ridge. R. at 789. As part of the negotiations, 
PacifiCorp attempted to resolve the situation by simply negotiating a new and differently-
worded easement over Fox Ridge's property—an easement that would expressly set forth 
PacifiCorp's right to install the single-pole structures. Id. To this end, PacifiCorp delivered 
to Fox Ridge a proposed draft new easement, intended to resolve the situation. R. at 594. 
The district court correctly excluded this 2000 draft easement under Rule 408, which 
provides that "[e]vidence of. . . offering . . . a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." Utah R. Evid. 408. 
Fox Ridge argues, incredibly, that in June 2000 there was no actual dispute between Fox 
Ridge and PacifiCorp. See Aplt. Br., at 40-41. Fox Ridge emphasizes that the June 2000 
meeting at which PacifiCorp delivered the proposed new easement was the first time Fox 
Ridge had learned of PacifiCorp's desire to replace the wooden poles, and states that "[i]t 
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was only when Fox Ridge said no to PacifiCorp's proposal that a dispute arose." Id. at 41-
42. This incredible argument simply cannot withstand scrutiny. 
Whether or not PacifiCorp's offer was made before (or after) Fox Ridge learned of 
PacifiCorp's desire to replace the structures, the offer is still just that: an offer of 
compromise. Rule 408 does not create some sort of exception for offers of compromise 
made at an extremely early stage of the process. A settlement offer is a settlement offer, no 
matter when the offer is conveyed to the other side, and settlement offers are not admissible 
under Rule 408. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit or 
consider the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement. 
2. The 2000 Fox Ridge Easement is irrelevant 
The district court's decision to exclude the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement was correct for 
an independent reason: that 2000 draft easement is irrelevant to an interpretation of a 1956 
easement, and sheds absolutely no light upon what the parties may have intended in 1956. 
First of all, as noted above, the Easements are unambiguous, and extrinsic evidence 
is inadmissible when construing an unambiguous document. See Plateau. 802 P.2d at 725. 
Second, even if extrinsic evidence were generally admissible and relevant, 
this particular piece of extrinsic evidence would be irrelevant. It is a draft document offered 
in settlement negotiations 44 years after the Easements at issue here were drafted and 
executed. Merely because PacifiCorp may have selected different or more explicit language 
some 44 years later has no bearing whatsoever on the interpretation of the Easements. The 
district court properly recognized that PacifiCorp was "merely acting out of an abundance 
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of caution in seeking an amended grant," and that the 2000 language may have simply been 
a more specific restatement of the same rights granted in the 1956 Easements. See R. at 982. 
The 2000 Fox Ridge Easement is inadmissible evidence of settlement negotiations, 
and is in any event utterly irrelevant to any reasoned interpretation of the Easements. The 
district court correctly refused to consider it. 
C. The District Court Correctly Excluded Evidence Regarding Easements 
Granted to UP&L in the 1970s, 1980s, and Beyond 
For many of the same reasons, the district court also correctly excluded evidence of 
what Fox Ridge refers to as the Carlson Easement. In 1989, PacifiCorp obtained an easement 
from one Michael Carlson over property that is not even along the 90th South-Hale line. That 
easement contains language somewhat more expansive that the language used in 1956, in the 
Easements at issue here. See R. at 603 (Carlson Easement specifying the use of single-pole 
steel support structures). Fox Ridge attempted to use the Carlson Easement below to argue 
that "UP&L knew how to draft broad easement language." See R. at 648. This argument is 
meritless. 
For obvious reasons, the Carlson Easement is not relevant to interpretation of the 
Easement because, among other reasons, it was granted more than thirty years after the 
Easements—at a time when single steel poles (which is what the Carlson Easement specifies) 
had become more common. As the district court intimated, merely because PacifiCorp used 
more specific language several decades later does not mean that the 1956 Easements do not 
already grant PacifiCorp the right to install single-pole steel support structures. R. at 982. 
The district court's decision to exclude easements entered into decades after the fact 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
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D. The District Court Correctly Excluded Certain Paragraphs of the Rustin 
Tolbert and James Christensen Affidavits 
Finally, the district court correctly excluded certain paragraphs contained in the 
affidavits submitted by Rustin Tolbert and James Christensen. The district court excluded 
these paragraphs because Mr. Tolbert and Mr. James Christensen "make assertions of 
damages that are purely speculative, list damages to Tractus (a nonparty to these 
proceedings), and speculate as to the fears of potential buyers and the necessary setbacks." 
See R. at 982. This decision and reasoning are correct, and do not represent an abuse of the 
district court's discretion. 
Before the district court, Fox Ridge cited both the Tolbert and the James Christensen 
affidavits as support for the assertion that PacifiCorp's proposed use would impose "new and 
substantially heavier burdens on the servient property than were intended by UP&L and the 
Clarks." R. at 640. The affidavits assert that the proposed new structures will necessitate 
substantial set-backs from the easement, which would reduce the number of otherwise 
marketable lots, devalue surrounding lots, decrease the revenue that Tractus would otherwise 
be able to realize for the sale of certain services to the prospective owners of the lots, and 
generally cause "concern," or, as Mr. Tolbert vaguely puts it, "high voltage steel towers are 
a real concern to D.R. Horton," a large home builder. See generally R. at 192-94 (J. 
Christensen Affidavit); R. at 188 (Tolbert Affidavit). Like the Carlson Easement, however, 
these affidavits are extrinsic to the Easements and are entirely irrelevant to the interpretation 
of the intent of the parties. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in summary judgment 
proceedings, "[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
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shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters sworn therein." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) 
(emphasis added). Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part that 
"[ejvidence which is not relevant is not admissible." 
The affidavit testimony at issue does not meet the Rule 56(e) standard. It is irrelevant 
because the question is not, as Fox Ridge has framed it, whether the new structures will pose 
a greater burden to the land than do the existing structures. Rather, the relevant question is 
whether the new structures will increase the burden beyond that permitted by the Easements. 
As discussed above, the burden that can be permissibly placed on a servient estate is 
measured by the rights granted under the easement, not the extent to which an easement 
holder may have exercised those rights in the past. See, e.g., Talty, 347 N.E.2d at 76 (taller 
transmission structures authorized under powerline easement; initial use of the easement 
"does not indicate any intention to limit the easement to lines of that size"); Ashby, 530 
S.W.2d at 631-32 (trial court's conclusion that easement holder's rights were limited to the 
original H-Frames placed in the easement would result in a forfeiture of the rights granted 
under the easement). 
The James Christensen and Tolbert affidavits assert that PacifiCorp's proposed new 
structures would require a greater set-back than is required by the existing structures and 
would therefore reduce the number of otherwise developable building lots. However, Fox 
Ridge purchased the property with full knowledge of the terms of the easement. The terms 
of the Easements are what they are. If, as Fox Ridge asserted below, those terms are clear 
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and unambiguous, then it is those terms alone that define the scope of the burden that may 
be placed on the servient estate. 
The irrelevance of the James Christensen Affidavit is further illustrated by analysis 
of Mr. Christensen's assertions relating to Tractus, LLC. Tractus purported to be a named 
counterclaim plaintiff in the district court proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that it was 
not a party to the original complaint, it never moved to intervene, the district court did not 
order that it be joined, and it has no ownership interest in the subject property. Yet Mr. 
Christensen asserts that Tractus will lose between three and five million dollars in revenue 
that it supposedly "would have realized from the sale of voice, video, internet and other 
services," which Tractus allegedly would otherwise have been able to sell to the prospective 
owners of the lots that will purportedly be lost to set-backs occasioned by the PacifiCorp's 
proposed use. See R. at 193. Mr. Christensen's assertion is inadmissible for three reasons. 
First, Tractus, as a mere contractor with no ownership interest in property, lacks standing to 
assert any claims based on the Easements. Second, even if Tractus were faced with losses 
asserted, such losses would be utterly irrelevant to the scope of the Easements. And third, 
Mr. Christensen's statements about Tractus' purported claims are entirely speculative. 
The third paragraph of the James Christensen Affidavit is also defective because it 
lacks foundation to establish that Mr. Christensen has any personal knowledge concerning 
the matters to which he has testified. Specifically: (1) the assertion in f^ 3.a. relating to the 
400-600 foot setbacks appears to be based on hearsay from the Tolbert Affidavit; (2) the 
damage figure in f^ 3.a. of $7-12 million is admittedly speculative; (3) the references in 
Tf 3.a.i. to Tractus' purported losses are based upon hearsay and speculation; (4) the 
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references in f 3.a.ii. to "perceived health fears and safety perceptions among the public and 
home builders" are speculative and/or hearsay, and are not based upon personal knowledge; 
(5) the references in fflf 3.a.ii. and iii. with respect to damages in the millions of dollars are 
speculative on their face; and (6) the references in f 3.a.iv. to Fox Ridge's and Tractus' loss 
of right to obtain "quality power" and the increased cost of power is entirely speculative, as 
are the damages figures estimated there, and, further, have absolutely nothing whatsoever to 
do with the scope of the Easements. See R. at 192-93. 
Likewise, the Tolbert Affidavit is vague with respect to the meaning of the term 
"concern" in paragraphs 3 and 4, lacks foundation with respect to the assertions in 
paragraphs 5 and 6 concerning a 400-600 foot set-back, and is also vague about whether such 
a set-back is a statutory or regulatory requirement, a recommendation or merely a preference 
of one particular house builder. See R. at 188. 
Even if the Easements were ambiguous, evidence regarding whether the new single-
pole structures impose greater burdens on Fox Ridge's property than do the existing 
structures would be irrelevant in determining the scope of the Easements. Whether the 
current landowners find the exercise of the rights under the Easements to be unduly 
burdensome is not a relevant consideration in a determination of what the landowners and 
UP&L intended in 1956 when the Easements were granted. 
In sum, the Christensen Affidavit and the Tolbert Affidavit are extrinsic to the 
Easements, and they do not have any tendency to prove any fact that is of consequence to the 
interpretation of the scope of the Easements. Moreover, the affidavits are immaterial to the 
issue of whether the proposed new structures will increase the burden beyond that permitted 
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by the Easements. At most, they support the irrelevant proposition that the proposed new 
structures will pose a greater burden to the land than do the existing structures. Further, the 
affidavits are vague, lacking in foundation and rife with hearsay and speculation. 
Accordingly, under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the referenced 
paragraphs of the affidavits are inadmissible, and the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding them. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED FOX RIDGE'S MOTION 
FOR RULE 56(f) CONTINUANCE 
The third and final issue before this Court is whether the district court correctly denied 
Fox Ridge's conditional motion for a continuance based on Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). As noted 
above, the district court's decision to deny a Rule 56(f) motion is reviewed only for abuse 
of discretion. See supra, p. 1-2. The trial court denied Fox Ridge's Rule 56(f) motion 
because it found that the Easements were unambiguous and therefore their "scope could be 
determined from the face of the documents]." See R. at 982. The district court's decision 
in this case was sound, and was not an abuse of discretion. 
Fox Ridge's Rule 56(f) motion was based on the premise that, if the trial court did not 
interpret the Easements Fox Ridge's way, then Fox Ridge would need to conduct additional 
discovery in order to obtain extrinsic evidence (e.g., witness testimony) that may shed light 
on the intentions of the parties in 1956.9 See R. at 174-75. The trial court, however, ruled 
9
 Fox Ridge also argues, here on appeal, that the trial court "denied Fox Ridge any 
opportunity to be heard on its motion for summary judgment on its RDA claims." Aplt. Br., 
at 47. This argument is utterly specious. The trial court did nothing of the sort—it simply 
postponed entertaining Fox Ridge's RDA motion until such time as Fox Ridge served 
process on one of the defendants on the RDA claims. After the trial court's mling, Fox 
(continued...) 
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that the Easements were unambiguous and that they could be interpreted without resort to 
extrinsic evidence. As the trial court stated, "[a]ny additional discovery would have 
constituted unnecessary extraneous evidence as to the meaning of the grant." R. at 982. In 
such a situation, any additional discovery is meaningless, and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing additional time for discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's rulings and orders in this case 
should be affirmed in all respects. 
9
 (...continued) 
Ridge allowed some 17 months to go by without taking any action whatsoever on those 
claims, which were eventually dismissed for failure to prosecute (a result Fox Ridge notably 
does not appeal). Fox Ridge cannot plausibly argue that it was denied an opportunity to be 
heard on claims ultimately dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
Indeed, Fox Ridge's entire appeal rings hollow here, given its own unreasonably long 
delay in presenting this material for appeal. See, e.g., Ottenheimer v. Mountain States 
Supply Co., 188 P. 1117, 1118 (Utah 1920) (acquiescence in title dispute by defendant 
moving from property); cf. Congolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 1221-22 
(Utah Ct. App.) (acquiescence and acceptance-of-the-benefit where appellant did not seek 
stay of order but instead accepted settlement proceeds), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990). Here, the trial court issued a written ruling granting PacifiCorp's motion on March 
12, 2001, and issued an order memorializing the ruling on April 11, 2001. Almost 
immediately, PacifiCorp proceeded to replace the H-frame structures with single-pole 
structures. PacifiCorp, at great expense, completed that work soon thereafter, to the benefit 
of the downstream power consumers. Despite PacifiCorp's open and obvious work on Fox 
Ridge's property, Fox Ridge chose none of several alternatives available to it to posture this 
matter for appeal, such as a motion seeking a stay pending appeal, a motion for preliminary 
injunction, or a petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. Likewise, Fox Ridge did 
not serve its action against Lehi RDA or voluntarily dismiss the RDA claims without 
prejudice, and thereby effectuate an appealable judgment on the Easements issues. Instead, 
Fox Ridge did nothing and simply waited until the trial court dismissed Fox Ridge's RDA 
claims for failure to prosecute. Fox Ridge's two-year period of acquiescence in the existence 
of the new steel poles undercuts the arguments it makes here on appeal. 
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